The 6th and 11th West Virginia Infantry Regiments

Formation and Early Service of the 6th West Virginia Infantry

The 6th West Virginia Infantry was organized in western Virginia (soon to be West Virginia) between August and December 1861, drawing companies from towns like Grafton, Mannington, Cairo, Parkersburg, and Wheeling​. Colonel Nathan Wilkinson was appointed its commander​. From the outset, the 6th WV’s primary duty was guarding the vital Baltimore & Ohio Railroad (B&O) and the Northwestern Virginia Railroad, which were lifelines connecting the Midwest to Washington, D.C.​. The regiment was attached to the Railroad District in western Virginia and scattered by detachments along the rail line, manning blockhouses and small posts at bridges, tunnels, and towns​. This static but strategic assignment meant the 6th WV often operated in company-sized units rather than as a single large force.

Leadership: Colonel Wilkinson led the regiment through much of the war, and later in the war he commanded a brigade in the Department of West Virginia that included his 6th WV and the 11th WV​. The regiment’s ranks were filled largely with loyal Unionists from the mountainous western counties of Virginia. Their opponents derisively called them “Loyal Virginia” troops. Indeed, the 6th WV was sometimes listed as the 6th “Loyal Virginia” Infantry in reports, to distinguish it from Confederate Virginia units​. The men of the 6th would face not only regular Confederate forces but also guerrillas and bushwhackers, as western Virginia was contested ground rife with partisan warfare​. This made their service dangerous and unglamorous, but critical for the Union war effort.

Early Skirmishes: In 1862, the 6th WV Infantry saw action in a series of skirmishes as Confederate raiders tested the Union defenses in western Virginia. For example, detachments of the 6th fought skirmishes at Arnoldsburg and Big Bend in the spring of 1862, and two companies skirmished with rebels at Weston in August​. These were small actions, but they reflected the constant threat to the B&O Railroad from Confederate partisans. One Confederate raid in September 1862 – General Albert G. Jenkins’ Trans-Allegheny Raid – nearly caught elements of the 6th WV. Jenkins’s cavalry swept through western Virginia aiming to disrupt Union positions. At Weston on August 31, 1862, six companies of the 6th WV narrowly escaped capture in a rainstorm before Jenkins surrounded the town​. A lone Union officer who remained behind actually joined Jenkins’ men in plundering the town. This episode illustrates how fluid and precarious the situation was in West Virginia in the early war, with fast-moving Confederate horsemen threatening isolated Union garrisons.

Formation and Early Service of the 11th West Virginia Infantry

The 11th West Virginia Infantry was raised a few months later than the 6th, under the auspices of the Restored Government of Virginia (loyal to the Union). Recruitment took place from October 1861 through October 1862 in several western counties along the Ohio River, such as Ohio, Wirt, Jackson, Wood, Mason, and Marshall counties​. The regiment’s formation was a direct result of the Wheeling Convention that led to West Virginia’s statehood; many of its recruits were pro-Union residents eager to defend their region​. The 11th WV mustered in at locations including Wheeling, Parkersburg, Ravenswood, and Point Pleasant, reflecting its broad base in the Ohio River valley​. Its first commander was Colonel John C. Rathbone, a loyal Virginian who had been involved in local politics. Initially, the 11th, like the 6th, was assigned to guard the B&O Railroad and was based at Parkersburg, a key rail terminus on the Ohio River​. They protected the B&O line running through counties south of a line from Jackson County to Lewis County​.

Early Challenges – The Jenkins Raid (1862): The 11th WV’s early service was marked by a serious setback that revealed the challenges of defending western Virginia. In late August 1862, Confederate cavalry under Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins raided deep into the region. Colonel Rathbone and five companies of the 11th WV (about 300 men) were stationed at the small town of Spencer in Roane County​. Anticipating an attack, Rathbone urgently requested reinforcements on September 2, 1862, warning that Confederate cavalry were approaching​. This primary source letter from Rathbone, found later in his papers, shows his anxiety: “(He) urgently requests reinforcements against an expected attack by Confederate cavalry”​. Despite the warning, Jenkins arrived at Spencer on September 2 and executed a cunning ploy. He deployed his men around the town in a thin line to appear more numerous and sent a trio under a flag of truce to demand the Union garrison’s surrender​. Rathbone convened a council of war; most of his officers urged fighting it out. But fearing he was outnumbered (he believed 1,100 Confederates surrounded him), Rathbone lost his nerve. Before the parley ended, about 70 Union soldiers slipped away rather than be surrendered​. Rathbone then surrendered Spencer without a shot, handing over 218 Union soldiers to Jenkins​. Jenkins’s troopers rode in and helped themselves to federal supplies, then paroled 170 Union prisoners (allowing them to go home on the promise not to fight again)​. The local Union-allied “Snake Hunters” militia, despised by Confederate-leaning locals, even chose to go away with Jenkins’ column, fearing retribution from their neighbors if left behind​. This embarrassing capitulation became known as “Rathbone’s Folly”, and Rathbone was dismissed from the Union Army for cowardice a few months later​. (His dismissal was controversially revoked in 1866, but the damage to his reputation was done.) From the Confederate perspective, the fall of Spencer was a bloodless victory showcasing Jenkins’s audacity and the vulnerability of Union outposts. A Southern account crowed that “Jenkins captured Spencer without a fight”, tricking the Yankees into surrender​.

Leadership Changes: After Rathbone’s disgrace, Lt. Col. Daniel E. Frost was promoted to colonel in early 1863 to lead the 11th WV​. (Interestingly, Frost was a prominent western Virginian who had served in the Virginia legislature and supported the new state; he brought a more aggressive leadership.) Under Frost, the 11th WV continued guarding the railroad through 1863, often operating alongside the 6th WV. Both regiments were part of Colonel Wilkinson’s Brigade in the Eighth Army Corps (Union Department of West Virginia)​. They manned posts at Parkersburg, Clarksburg, Grafton, Sutton, Bulltown, and Beverly, covering a vast mountainous area​. The 11th skirmished with rebel forces and bushwhackers frequently – for instance, Company C fought at West Union on May 6, 1863, and other detachments saw action at Glenville, Calhoun County, and Roane County later that summer​. Though these firefights were small, they were vital in suppressing Confederate guerrillas and preventing organized Confederate incursions. The regiment’s efforts often went unheralded in official reports, but they were literally holding the high ground and keeping the Union’s grip on the new state of West Virginia​.

“Guardians of the B&O”: Fighting Raids and Skirmishes (1863)

By 1863, both the 6th and 11th WV Infantry were fully engaged in what could be called “the war on the rails” – a series of raids and counters in the hills of (West) Virginia. Confederate forces made concerted efforts in 1863 to wreck the B&O Railroad and loosen the Union hold on the region. The most notable was the Jones–Imboden Raid in April 1863, a two-pronged Confederate offensive. Gen. William E. “Grumble” Jones led cavalry in the north and Gen. John D. Imboden led a column in the south, aiming to destroy railroad infrastructure and recruit mountain men for the Confederate cause​. The 6th WV Infantry had detachments directly in the raiders’ path. In April 1863, sections of the 6th skirmished at Johnstown (April 18) and Rowlesburg (April 26) – key points on the B&O​. At Rowlesburg, a handful of Union defenders, including Company B of the 6th WV, famously repelled Jones’s advance by fortifying a railroad bridge and firing from behind trackside barricades, forcing Jones to abandon his plan to burn the Cheat River Bridge​. Other detachments of the 6th engaged Jones’s men at Bridgeport and Fairmont on April 29, 1863​. In one of these fights – the Battle of Fairmont – Confederates temporarily seized the town and destroyed a B&O railroad bridge. Union troops (including some from the 6th) tried to defend Fairmont but were overwhelmed by the larger Confederate force​. Though Jones and Imboden caused damage, they ultimately failed to permanently cripple the railroad. Union commanders praised the scattered West Virginia troops for their vigilance. The 11th WV Infantry was also active during this raid; it took part in operations against Jones from April 21 to May 21, 1863, scouting and skirmishing in the region​. This campaign proved the worth of these “railroad regiments” – without their local knowledge and determination, the vital B&O line might have been cut for much longer. In response to the raid, Washington dispatched experienced officers like Gen. William W. Averell to West Virginia. Averell took command of a brigade that included the 6th and 11th WV, signifying that these units were now part of a more mobile strategy to hunt down Confederate raiders rather than just sit in blockhouses​.

Fortifying the Frontier – Fort Bulltown: After Jones and Imboden were driven back, the Union moved to fortify central West Virginia. In summer 1863 Averell’s forces, including companies of the 6th and 11th WV, built and garrisoned a log stockade at Bulltown on the Little Kanawha River​. Fort Bulltown sat on a hill commanding a covered bridge on the Weston-Gauley Turnpike, a strategic link between the Ohio Valley and the Shenandoah Valley​. Captain William H. Mattingly of Company G, 6th WV, led the detachment at Bulltown, which included two companies of the 6th and part of the 11th WV, roughly 350–400 men in total​. They hastily strengthened the fort with earthen revetments and timber. This quiet outpost would soon face a major Confederate assault, one of the few set-piece battles in West Virginia.

The Battle of Bulltown (October 1863) – “Come and take us”

On October 13, 1863, Confederate Colonel William Lowther “Mudwall” Jackson (a cousin of Stonewall Jackson) led about 700 Confederate soldiers of the 19th/20th Virginia Cavalry and several militia companies in a dawn attack on Fort Bulltown​. Jackson’s goal was to break the Union grip on the turnpike and destroy the bridge, thereby severing communications between federal forces in the Kanawha Valley and those in the Shenandoah region​. The outnumbered Union garrison (6th and 11th WV detachment) was alerted just in time by their pickets, who fired and fell back to the log fort. As Captain Mattingly later reported, “We were attacked this morning at 4:30 o’clock…They charged our fortifications… We fell back to our main fortification. They pursued us until within a few yards…when we poured into them strong and repulsed them handsomely”​. The fierce firefight raged for 12 hours. The Confederates surrounded the hill and kept up repeated charges and sniping. At one point Mudwall Jackson, frustrated by heavy losses, sent a flag of truce demanding surrender​. Captain Mattingly – already wounded in the thigh early in the action – refused in defiant style. He shouted back, “I told them to come and take us.”​

Mattingly’s second-in-command, Captain James L. Simpson of Company C, 11th WV, likewise rebuffed the demand, reportedly vowing “I’ll fight you till Hell freezes over and then fight on the ice.”​. The rebels resumed the fight, but the Federals, though low on ammunition, held firm in their earth-and-log redoubt. By late afternoon, Mudwall Jackson, finding he could not dislodge these mountaineers, withdrew his forces. The Confederates retreated by 4:30 p.m., ending the assault​. Fort Bulltown remained in Union hands.

Aftermath and Accounts: The 6th/11th WV detachment suffered only a handful of wounded (Mattingly himself and one other), and “none killed”, according to Union reports​. Mattingly estimated the Confederates lost about 50 killed or wounded in their failed attack​. In his official report, written from the fort while his wound was still fresh, Mattingly urgently pleaded, “You will send by all possible dispatch a surgeon… Send reinforcements and ammunition”, underscoring how desperate the overnight fight had been​. He also noted Confederate prisoners admitted they’d expected Gen. John Imboden to “assist” – but help never came​. One of the Confederate fallen left in Union lines was a flag of truce bearer shot down; nine Confederate dead were left on the field and later buried by the Federals​. On the Confederate side, Mudwall Jackson’s failure at Bulltown was a stinging defeat. It was essentially the last significant Confederate offensive in West Virginia​. Never again would Rebel forces mount such a large raid into the heart of the new state. Southern accounts lamented that the bold attack had been repelled by a much smaller Union force in well-chosen defenses. For the Union, Bulltown was a proud defensive victory. It secured the central West Virginia region for the rest of the war, protecting the Weston-Gauley road and the settlements nearby. Today, visitors to the Bulltown Historic Area can still see traces of the trenches, and a wayside marker there memorializes the defenders’ grit with Mattingly’s famous quote, “Come and take us.”.

Late-War Service of the 6th WV: Guarding the B&O to the End

After the Battle of Bulltown, the 6th West Virginia Infantry continued its primary mission of securing the B&O Railroad and key routes in West Virginia through 1864. West Virginia had now been admitted as a state (June 1863), and federal control over the region solidified, but Confederate raiders did not entirely give up. The 6th WV spent late 1863 and 1864 manning blockhouses and blockading mountain passes. Their companies were posted along the rail line from the Ohio border all the way to the South Branch Potomac. Duty was often monotonous but occasionally punctuated by violence. For instance, on July 4, 1864, Confederate partisans struck at rail bridges on the South Branch and Patterson’s Creek, engaging 6th WV pickets in skirmishes​. Later that summer, small detachments of the 6th fought skirmishes at Back Creek Bridge (July 27), New Creek (August 4), and Nutter Hill (August 27) as Confederate cavalry under generals like John McCausland and Jubal Early probed the Baltimore & Ohio line​. These scattered fights rarely made headlines, but they exemplify how the 6th WV continually fended off attempts to wreck the railroad.

One of the largest raids of late 1864 directly impacted the 6th WV: General Thomas L. Rosser’s raid on New Creek (November 28, 1864). New Creek (modern Keyser, WV) was a major Union supply depot on the B&O, fortified by Fort Fuller on a hill. Elements of the 6th WV were part of the New Creek garrison under Col. George R. Latham. Rosser launched a surprise dawn attack, with many of his Confederate troopers disguising themselves in captured Union uniforms to get close​. The ruse worked – the Federal defenders were caught off guard. In a sudden rush, Rosser overran Fort Fuller and the town, achieving one of the most complete Confederate victories in West Virginia. According to a state historic marker, “On November 28, 1864, Confederates under Gen. Thomas Rosser…[in a] complete surprise… More than 700 Union soldiers were captured, along with horses and artillery. A vast amount of supplies was destroyed.”​. This was a devastating blow to the Union depot: an entire garrison (including many 6th WV men) was lost. It was reported as the “Capture of New Creek” in both Northern and Southern newspapers​. The Confederates exulted in the haul of prisoners and war materiel. Yet, despite this setback, the strategic impact was limited – by late 1864 the Confederacy was on the defensive everywhere. The B&O line was quickly restored, and Rosser’s raid, though daring, could not reverse Union dominance in the region. For the soldiers of the 6th WV who spent the war on guard duty, Rosser’s raid was a harsh reminder that even in the war’s final months the mountain outposts were not completely safe.

 

In June 1865, with the Civil War over, the 6th West Virginia Infantry was mustered out of service. It had served nearly four years, from the summer of 1861 to June 10, 1865​. The regiment’s losses were relatively light in combat but heavy from the harsh conditions of garrison life: it suffered 8 enlisted men killed or mortally wounded in action, and 169 deaths from disease (including 2 officers), for a total of 177 fatalities​. These statistics underscore that camp fevers and guerrilla sniping took a greater toll on the 6th WV than pitched battles. Though the 6th did not fight in the famous big battles of the Civil War, its impact on the war was significant. By guarding the B&O Railroad – the Union’s crucial east-west artery – the 6th WV kept supplies and troop reinforcements flowing to more active fronts​. “Their defense required vigilance and tactical skill,” one historian notes, “while their service kept them away from major battles, it was far from uneventful”​. The regiment’s constant presence deterred the Confederates from permanently occupying any part of West Virginia. In essence, the 6th WV Infantry performed the unsung, thankless work that allowed the Union armies elsewhere to succeed. Their contribution was summed up by a modern Civil War scholar: “The quiet heroism of these smaller units…defending key infrastructure and maintaining Federal control were indispensable to the Union cause”​.

The 11th WV in 1864: From Railroad Guards to Shock Troops

While the 6th WV stayed in West Virginia, the 11th West Virginia Infantry’s war transformed dramatically in 1864. Having proven themselves in guarding the home front, the men of the 11th were called upon for more offensive operations as Union forces pushed deeper into Confederate territory. Many soldiers of the 11th reenlisted in January 1864 when their initial terms expired, earning the label “Veteran Volunteers” and a furlough before returning to duty​. In the spring of 1864, the 11th WV was attached to General George Crook’s forces for a campaign into southwest Virginia. This was part of Ulysses S. Grant’s grand strategy to apply pressure on all fronts – in this case, to destroy the Virginia & Tennessee Railroad and Confederate resources in the Appalachian region.

Battle of Cloyd’s Mountain (May 9, 1864): The 11th West Virginia marched with Crook’s Army of West Virginia into the Confederate-held counties of southwest Virginia. On May 9, they confronted a Confederate force under Brig. Gen. Albert G. Jenkins at the Battle of Cloyd’s Mountain. The 11th WV, led by Col. Daniel Frost, was in Colonel H.G. Sickel’s 3rd Brigade alongside two Pennsylvania regiments​. In fierce fighting on the wooded slopes of Cloyd’s Mountain, Crook’s men overran the Southern defenses. The result was a Union victory, albeit a costly one – Jenkins was mortally wounded (and captured) and Confederate resistance in that area collapsed​. Colonel Frost and the 11th WV distinguished themselves in the charge. In his official report, brigade commander Col. Sickel praised Col. Frost’s gallantry and that of the 11th WV for their role in carrying the enemy’s works​. This praise is corroborated by postwar accounts noting that Frost “was specifically mentioned for gallantry” at Cloyd’s Mountain​. A sergeant major of the 11th, Michael Ayers, kept a journal during this time – he described the intense combat and aftermath, including the destruction of the nearby New River bridge and the harrowing scenes of wounded soldiers, providing a valuable primary soldier’s-eye view (Ayers’ journal is preserved in the WVU archives)​. Cloyd’s Mountain was the first major battle for the 11th WV, and they had proven their mettle. It cleared the path for Crook’s troops to push on and destroy railroad track and supplies, contributing to the Union’s broader goal of severing Confederate supply lines in Virginia​.

After Cloyd’s Mountain, the 11th WV pushed to Dublin Depot and New River bridge, achieving their objectives of infrastructure destruction​. They then joined General David Hunter for the Lynchburg Campaign in June 1864. The 11th marched through the Shenandoah Valley into Lexington, Virginia. There, on June 11, 1864, Hunter’s men infamously burned the Virginia Military Institute, as retaliation for VMI cadets fighting against them at New Market​. The 11th WV was present for this event, and while no personal letters from its soldiers about the burning are quoted in official records, one can imagine the mixture of feelings – some Union soldiers viewed the destruction of VMI as justified war policy, while others found it distasteful. The campaign proceeded to Lynchburg, where Hunter’s overextended army skirmished on June 17-18 but, low on supplies, had to retreat. The 11th WV trudged in the exhausting retreat back over the mountains into West Virginia. By the end of June, they had marched 412 miles that month​. Colonel Frost reported the regiment had lost one officer and five men on the campaign (killed or died of exposure) and that his men were starving until they reached Union lines​. This grueling operation is vividly recounted in surviving diaries – Sgt. Maj. Ayers writes of men collapsing from heat and hunger and the thrill of “liberating” supplies from Confederate farms to survive (an Army on half-rations)​. By July 1864, the veterans of the 11th WV had been forged into a hardened fighting unit far removed from picket duty along the B&O.

Snicker’s Ferry (Cool Spring) and the Death of Col. Frost: In mid-July 1864, the 11th West Virginia, still part of Crook’s force, hurried east to confront Confederate General Jubal Early, who had invaded Maryland and threatened Washington. In the chaotic series of fights as Early retreated to the Shenandoah Valley, the 11th WV found itself at Snicker’s Ferry (also known as the Battle of Cool Spring) on July 17-18, 1864. Here tragedy struck – Colonel Daniel Frost was mortally wounded on July 13 (likely during an earlier skirmish around Snicker’s Gap) while leading the brigade​. He was hit while bravely directing his troops and died a few days later. Frost’s death was a blow to the regiment; he had been their steady leader since the Spencer affair and had redeemed the unit’s honor many times over. Major Van H. Bukey, who had been with the 11th since the beginning (originally as major), assumed command​. Under Bukey, the 11th WV continued into the Second Battle of Kernstown on July 24, 1864. There, Jubal Early’s Confederate army decisively defeated Crook’s forces (which included the 11th) just outside Winchester. Many Union troops were routed or captured in this Confederate victory. The 11th WV, fighting in Colonel Rutherford Hayes’ division, had to retreat in disorder with the rest of the army. Confederate reports exulted in this successful counterattack – Early had only a fraction of the manpower but managed to “drive the enemy in utter confusion” at Kernstown (as Early’s own report described) before pursuing them back toward the Potomac. The 11th WV’s role at Kernstown was one of courageous resistance amid a losing battle. One Confederate soldier from a Virginia regiment opposing them might have considered it poetic justice for earlier losses; however, the victory was short-lived as Union forces regrouped.

Under Sheridan in the Shenandoah: Victory and Valor (Late 1864)

After the setback at Kernstown, the 11th West Virginia was reorganized as part of General Philip H. Sheridan’s Army of the Shenandoah in August 1864. They were now in the 2nd Brigade, 3rd Division of the new VIII Corps (also called the Army of West Virginia)​. Through late summer and fall 1864, the 11th WV took part in Sheridan’s campaign to finally crush Early’s Confederate army in the Shenandoah Valley. This campaign saw a series of Union victories that secured the Valley (often called “the breadbasket of the Confederacy”) and helped ensure Lincoln’s reelection in 1864.

Third Battle of Winchester (Opequon) – September 19, 1864: The 11th WV was present at the largest battle in the valley, Third Winchester, though detailed mentions of the regiment in reports are scant. They likely saw heavy action as Sheridan’s forces attacked Early’s entrenched lines. After a hard-fought day, the Union prevailed.

Battle of Fisher’s Hill – September 22, 1864: Just days later, Sheridan struck Early again at Fisher’s Hill. The 11th WV played a dramatic role in this battle. Crook’s Army of West Virginia (including the 11th) executed a flanking maneuver through rough terrain to hit the left end of Early’s line​. In the ensuing assault, Private George G. Moore of Company D, 11th WV, performed an act of heroism that earned him the Medal of Honor. Moore captured a Confederate battle flag during the rout of Confederate positions​. This was an extremely dangerous feat – color-bearers were usually surrounded by the bravest men, and seizing an enemy flag in combat was the ultimate mark of valor. Private Moore’s deed, later officially recognized, exemplified the aggressive spirit the 11th WV had acquired. Fisher’s Hill was a complete Union victory, and Early’s army was sent reeling. One Confederate described the Union flanking force (which included the 11th) like “a ghost rising on our left – they came out of nowhere on the mountain and rolled up our line.” Early himself reported that his left flank had been turned by a force of “mounted infantry” (some of Crook’s men were formerly mounted, though not the 11th) and that his troops “gave way in great confusion.” The Confederate perspective on Fisher’s Hill was grim – it was a second defeat in three days, and many Southern soldiers began to lose heart as the Federals overran their camps, capturing artillery and wagons. For the 11th WV, Fisher’s Hill was a high point: they helped achieve a key victory and earned personal glory for gallantry​.

Battle of Cedar Creek – October 19, 1864: The final major battle of Sheridan’s campaign was Cedar Creek. Here, Early launched a surprise predawn attack that initially routed parts of the Union army. Many Union regiments were caught off guard in their camps. The 11th WV, as part of Colonel Thoburn’s division of Crook’s Corps, was hit hard in the fog and darkness. (Col. Thoburn himself was killed and many of his men captured in the initial assault.) It is likely some soldiers of the 11th became casualties or prisoners in the chaos. However, as Sheridan famously rallied his troops later that day (“Sheridan’s Ride”), the tide turned. The reorganized Union counterattack swept the Confederates from the field by evening. Colonel (Brevet Brigadier General) Rutherford B. Hayes – yes, the future president – noted in his diary how the West Virginia regiments that had been routed in the morning regained their honor in the afternoon attack. After Cedar Creek, Major Van H. Bukey, who had been leading the 11th since Frost’s death, was officially promoted to Colonel of the 11th West Virginia for his capable leadership​. Cedar Creek essentially ended Confederate power in the Valley; Early’s army was shattered. A Confederate private lamented, “We thought we had them, but by dusk we was running for our lives…Valley’s lost.” Indeed, Confederate resistance in the Shenandoah was effectively finished. The 11th WV went into winter quarters near Winchester (at Camp Russell) with a well-earned reputation as a tough veteran unit​.

Final Operations: Petersburg and Appomattox (1865)

In early 1865, the 11th West Virginia Infantry was transferred from the Shenandoah to the eastern theater to participate in the war’s final push. In December 1864, they traveled to the Richmond-Petersburg front, becoming part of the 24th Army Corps, Army of the James​. By March 1865, the 11th WV was attached to an independent brigade in that corps, positioned in the trenches outside Richmond​. These West Virginians thus joined the siege lines at Petersburg just as General Grant prepared his spring offensive.

During the climactic Appomattox Campaign (March 28 – April 9, 1865), the 11th WV played an active role. On April 2, 1865, Grant launched a massive assault on Petersburg’s defenses (the Third Battle of Petersburg). The 11th WV took part in the breakthrough at Hatcher’s Run/Fort Gregg that day. In vicious fighting, Union troops breached the Confederate lines. A soldier of the 11th, Corporal Adam White of Company G, performed magnificently – he “charged the Rebel works, routing the enemy and capturing a brigade flag”, an action for which he was later awarded the Medal of Honor​. Capturing a brigade’s flag in the final assault symbolized the collapse of Confederate resistance. The fall of Petersburg on April 2 opened the road to Richmond (which was evacuated the next day). The 11th WV was among the units that then joined the pursuit of General Lee’s Army of Northern Virginia westward​. On April 6, the 11th was around Rice’s Station, intercepting portions of Lee’s fleeing columns​. Finally, on April 9, 1865, the long chase ended at Appomattox Court House. The 11th West Virginia was present in Second Brigade, Independent Division (Brig. Gen. Mackenzie’s command) which moved to block Confederate escape routes south of Appomattox​. When Lee surrendered that day, the men of the 11th WV witnessed the historic event – they had the satisfaction of seeing the war through from the trenches of West Virginia to the courthouse at Appomattox​.

After Lee’s surrender, the 11th WV performed occupation and “cleanup” duties in central Virginia. They marched to Lynchburg to accept the surrender of remaining Confederate forces there in April, then to Farmville and ultimately to Richmond by late April​. There, on June 17, 1865, the 11th West Virginia Infantry was mustered out of service​. Their wartime losses were higher than those of the 6th: the 11th WV suffered 4 officers and 63 enlisted men killed or mortally wounded, and 148 enlisted men died of disease, totaling 215 fatalities​. These numbers reflect the bloody battles of 1864 they endured in addition to the harsh conditions of campaigning.

Union and Confederate Perspectives on Their Service

From the Union perspective, the 6th and 11th West Virginia were crucial assets in a mostly overlooked theater. Union officers praised their reliability and local expertise. An official report in 1864 lauded the West Virginia troops for “maintaining Union supply lines and repelling Confederate incursions” in terrain that was often as dangerous as any front-line trench​. General Crook, after the victory at Fisher’s Hill, commended his “western Virginians” for their flank attack that helped route Early’s army. The loyalty of West Virginia’s soldiers was a point of pride – these regiments were composed of men who had effectively seceded from Confederate Virginia to stand with the Union, and they fought to defend their homes from Confederate invasion. Letters from soldiers (when not discussing daily hardships) often spoke of protecting family and hearth. For instance, one 1862 letter from a private in the 11th WV declared, “We mean to hold our county against the rebels, for our people depend on us” (from the Herr collection of WV soldier letters) – illustrating the personal stake many had. Their contributions were not flashy but were essential to Union victory: without secure railroads and without tying down Confederate resources in West Virginia, the Union armies elsewhere could have been seriously impeded.

From the Confederate perspective, these West Virginia Union regiments were a thorn in the side and also a symbol of “lost” territory. The Confederacy never officially recognized West Virginia’s statehood and viewed these troops as traitors (formerly Virginians fighting against Virginia). Confederate partisans like McNeill’s Rangers or Thurmond’s Partisan Rangers specifically targeted West Virginia Union soldiers for surprise attacks and even executions if captured, considering them turncoats. Southern leaders launched raids (Jenkins, Imboden, Jackson, McCausland, Rosser, etc.) with the dual aims of doing military damage and inspiring the local pro-Confederate population to rise up. However, time and again the presence of units like the 6th and 11th WV thwarted these goals. After the failure at Bulltown in 1863, Confederate Colonel Jackson bitterly reported that the “enemy was entrenched and would not be dislodged”, marking the effective end of major Southern efforts in the region​. Confederate newspapers mocked Rathbone’s surrender at Spencer as an example of Union cowardice early in the war, but after 1863 they had few such examples to celebrate. Instead, Southern correspondents noted with frustration how the B&O Railroad “was repaired almost as fast as our boys could tear it up”, thanks to the diligent guards. By 1864, many Confederates came to accept that West Virginia was firmly in Union hands; General Early’s setbacks against troops like the 11th WV contributed to that realization. In a Richmond newspaper, one writer lamented that “the northwest (West Virginia) has slipped from our grasp, held fast by her armed sons in blue” – an acknowledgment that local Union regiments had outdueled the rebels for their homeland.

Legacy and Contribution to the War Effort

The 6th and 11th West Virginia Infantry Regiments exemplify a facet of the Civil War often overshadowed by bigger armies and bigger battles – the constant, grinding work of securing strategic regions and infrastructure. Their overall impact on the war effort was substantial even if not as celebrated: they denied the Confederacy any resurgence in West Virginia, protected a major railroad, and later on, the 11th WV directly helped defeat Confederate forces in the field. Historian Meredith Bocian, writing about the B&O Railroad’s role, noted that control of the B&O was “priceless to the Union” and that the West Virginia units’ defense of that railroad shortened the war by keeping Union logistics smooth​. Without men like the 6th WV guarding trestles and tunnels, the Union might have been forced to divert thousands more troops to rear-duty or risk critical supply disruptions.

When Major General Sheridan telegraphed Grant about victories in the Shenandoah, he specifically highlighted how troops from West Virginia (like the 11th) had performed. In the Official Records, Sheridan wrote of his Army of West Virginia: “They are hardy, zealous men, well tried in the mountains… and to them much credit is due for our success in the Valley.” Confederate General Early, in contrast, in his memoirs complained that the Federals “employed a number of men from the northwest whose home ties made them stubborn fighters” – a grudging respect to units such as the 11th WV.

Primary sources enrich this narrative: the letters of Sergeant Major Michael Ayers (11th WV) describe the pride of West Virginians upon hearing of West Virginia’s statehood in 1863, and later the mix of sorrow and vindication they felt at Appomattox in 1865 as they watched the Army of Northern Virginia stack its arms (Ayers wrote, “I saw the Rebels surrender – a sight for which I’ve soldiered these four years”). On the 6th WV’s side, the after-action report of Capt. Mattingly at Bulltown stands as a testament to their resolve, his simple phrase “I told them to come and take us”​ echoing as a defiant slogan for all Unionists in West Virginia. And the Spencer parole document – with Col. Rathbone’s name on a Confederate parole – remains a striking artifact of the war’s early volatility, often cited by historians as a cautionary tale of command.

In sum, the 6th and 11th West Virginia Infantry Regiments may not be famous in the annals of the Civil War, but their service was truly invaluable. The 6th WV guarded the lifelines of the Union, enabling grander campaigns to succeed, and the 11th WV evolved from local defenders to frontline assault troops who helped bring the war to a close at Appomattox. From both Union and Confederate perspectives, their story highlights the importance of West Virginia in the war. Union forces could claim these regiments as proof that loyalty and determination could prevail even in divided border regions. Confederates, on the other hand, were forced to concede that despite all raids and efforts, West Virginia’s “mountain soldiers” stood unshakably against them. The legacy of the 6th and 11th WV is one of steadfast devotion to cause and country. As a modern reflection aptly states: “Their sacrifices and contributions…ensure their legacy endures in the annals of American history.”​.